Switching Sides from Offense to Defense: Changing our Perspective to Limit Wars
Woodrow Wilson, the 28th president of the United States of America—the world’s first contender for world hegemony—once claim that he entered World War I to fight “the war to end all wars”. However, even after the conclusion of World War I, there was not only a second World War but also countless of other wars ranging from proxy wars during the Cold War era, to Korean War, to the Gulf War, to the Vietnam War, and now to the War on Terror ranging most prominently in Iraq and Afghanistan. The increasing frequency wars in addition to that the growing occurrence and acceptance rationalizing of preventive wars—such as Vietnam and Iraq—can be credited to what realists call the anarchic system. The structure—or lack of authority—in world government, that leaves states clamoring for survival and power. The anarchic system in an offense dominated world permits and creates the right breeding ground for fear, uncertainty, and the ever bothersome Prisoner’s Dilemma, increasingly the likelihood for states to enter into wars. Robert Jervis and Stephen Van Evera acknowledge and highlight the realities of our offense-defense world, further offering optimistic policy prescriptions of changing and widening perspectives through education, establishing clearer communication, and reforming our actions to become more distinguishable, ultimately switching gears from a offense dominant society to a defense dominant world. We might never be able to eliminate wars, but through policy changes, we might be able to mitigate aggression, reduce paranoia, and limit the security dilemma.
Robert Jervis in his article “Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma,” talks about how in the anarchic world that we live in, one state effort to improve its security winds up being ineffective, sometimes even to the point of counter-productive because it triggers strong efforts by opposing or neighboring states to beef up their security. However, Jervis theorizes that the security dilemma isn’t always prevalent in every situation. Jervis hypothesize that security dilemma tends to thrive in an offense dominated world—where it’s easier to attack than defend—especially one in which states’ actions are indistinguishable. Jervis is optimistic that we live in a defense dominated society—where it’s easier to defend than to attack. He believes that this is evident in the fact that geography and logistics appeal to a state’s defensive course of action and deter them from attacking others. Despite whether one believes we live in a defense dominant world, one thing is clear, and that is that in a defense dominant society, the security dilemma can be limited and aggression mitigated.
The international structure might always be anarchic but if a defense dominant society, aggression is unlikely because it is in everyone’s favor to act more defensively utilizing deterrence and containment instead of preventive attacks; this is precisely the reason why Mearsheimer reminisce often about the Cold War era. In a defense dominated society, states as rational actors would seek to cooperate instead of defecting; because we have turn the tables from playing the prisoners’ dilemma game to one of chicken. Whereas in an offense dominated society, all military acts are viewed through the lenses of skepticism and paranoia. Even in the best situation where other states actions are distinguishable, aggression is possible and likely and fuels the security dilemma, perhaps to the point where actions begun to blur and become indistinguishable, and that’s where preventive wars—such as Iraq—starts to occurs, wars thus becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy with no hope of a miraculous resolution for either parties.
Van Evera continues in his article, “Offense, Defense, and the Cause of War,” to hearken those sentiments that Jervis brought out. But he further emphasis on the idea that ultimately it is the world’s perception of states’ actions that determines where they stand and subsequently their actions. Van Evera credits the increasing rates of war to the fact that wars are likely to occur when conquest is easy. Van Evera elaborates that conquest is easier in an offense dominated world because states would seize chances for opportunistic or defensive expansions, adopting offense oriented internal policies—to allocate more of their military budget, adopt military training and doctrines, even to the extend that preventive wars are deemed legitimate and moral part of their foreign policy. However, Van Evera is optimistic that if we adopt different social and political structures, if the leaders of the great powers would focus inter-state relations, strengthening our diplomatic factors world wide, cooperation among states will be more profitable than defections, and wars are less likely to occur as frequently.
The first step towards a defense dominant society is to change our perspective. When we change our perspective, we can change our actions subsequently changing other’s actions. According to Van Evera’s research, states’ military actions doesn’t have a direct correlation with the likelihood of war, instead it is the perception of the military actions that has a stronger correlation with the outcome of war or lack thereof. The constructivist, Alexander Wendt in his article entitled “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” advocates that reality is based solely on perception. We may still live in a world crippled by the self-help system of anarchy, states actions towards each other is not a result of anarchy but of collective identity and state interaction. Great powers’ perception of themselves and others are the biggest threat to global security. And if we perceive the world not through the lenses of skepticisms and paranoia that is inherent in an offense dominated world, but with a clearer vision, with a clearer understanding of our relations and actions, we will be able to mitigate aggression, reduce paranoia, and limit the security dilemma and ultimately decrease the likelihood of war.
Wendt believes that states act and react based on meaning. States like individuals assign meaning to each act—military, political, and economical—that influence them. And by compiling these impressions and meanings, they form a social construction, deeming others as friend or foe. Realists like Mearsheimer might believe that a friend today is an enemy tomorrow, but Wendt believes that relations all depend on how you perceive others and vice versa. Wendt further advocates that we can change our own identity—our role-specific understand and expectations of self—and simultaneously the perception of others when we change our behavior. Van Evera believes that we can change our perspectives by acquiring better intelligence, by adopting military defensive force posture instead of offensives ones. States should seek to discourage attempts at global hegemony and preventing multipolar rivalries by having benevolent multipolar regional hegemonies. In order to discourage another world war with the regional hegemons, the regional hegemons should concentrate on deriving a plan for international security that would assist in developing a cooperative and healthy world economy and decrease worldwide military offensive budget and keeping an adequate proportion of domestic and regional defenses based on population and economic resources. In addition to those military stratagems, we could also further push in the direction of a defense dominant society by educating ourselves about the world, about their cultures, about their political structure, about their current identity and perspective of the world. Another suggestion by Van Evera is for states to craft arms control agreements to limit offensive force. There may not be a central international force to enforce the agreement, there may always be countries like Iran or North Korea who seeks more nuclear power, but if we reduce the level of desperation that is rampant in an anarchic offensive system, those countries that do choose the less optimal and less profitable choice of defection would more likely lean towards deterrence than to attacks. Van Evera propose that if states would strengthen their defensive alliances world wide, the low cost and high rates of benefits of cooperation would greatly outweigh defection that no rational actors would defect. Ultimately the only way to shed the uncertainty and paranoia of the offense dominated world, is through education and communication. The abstract policy prescriptions from Wendt coupled with the applicable changes supported by Van Evera could be the just the mix of ideology and practices that would lead us down an extensive route that would ultimately lead to peace.